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FEBRUARY CONFERENCE WILL 
EXAMINE FUTURE OF FAITH-
BASED HEALTH CARE 
Do individuals and institutions that 
provide health care for reasons of faith 
make a distinctive contribution to the 
larger community? Is it in the best 
interests of society to support, ignore or 
Stephen G. Post 
and the Debatable 
Demise of Dualism 
by David R. Larson 
Like a snake on the soft desert 
floor, dualism never seems to die. 
Smite it, render it what feels like a 
mortal blow, and it may lie in the sand 
ever so quietly. But try to fetch it as a 
trophy and it may strike, winning the 
battle after all. 
Whatever Happened to the Soul? 
Scientific and Theological Portraits of 
T{uman Nature (Minneapolis: Augsburg 
iortress, 1998), an excellent anthology 
Continued on page 2 
David R. Larson, DMin, PhD 
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oppose faith-based health-care deliv-
ery? What public and private policies 
are most likely to enable faith-based 
health-care centers to help those in 
need during the next century? How will 
clinicians serve most effectively? 
These questions, and others like 
them, will be the focus of attention at a 
national conference presented by the 
Center for Christian Bioethics and the 
Center for Spiritual Life and 
Wholeness held at the Wong Kerlee 
International Conference Center on the 
campus of Loma Linda University, 
February 27-28, 2000. 
This conference will be presented 
for policy makers, health care adminis-
trators, clinicians of all types and chap-
lains. Others, including attorneys, 
administrators of insurance programs, 
and social workers are also invited. 
Consideration will be given to 
alternative ways communities of faith 
might make positive contributions 
despite changing priorities and prac-
tices in health-care delivery. These 
changing circumstances provide the 
background and establish the need for 
the February conference. 
This will be the fourth national 
conference presented by the Center for 
Christian Bioethics and the Center for 
Spiritual Life and Wholeness at Lorna 
Linda University in as many years. 
More information is available by 
contacting Ms. Genie Sample at Lorna 
Linda University, CP11121S, Lorna 
Linda, CA 92350; Telephone: (909) 558-
4956; FAX: (909) 558-0336; E-mail: 
gsample@ethicscenter.llu.edu. 
Inside this issue 
"A Tale of Two 
Physicians" 
-Mark Carr 
Post on Dualism 
Continued from page 1 
edited by Warren S. Brown, Nancey 
Murphy, and H. Newton Malony, is one 
of the most recent and distinguished 
attempts to do away with dualism. 
"Dualism is dead; long live nonreduc-
tive physicalism!" is the theme that ties 
together its essays which were individ-
ually written by Francisco J. Ayala, V. 
Elving Anderson, Malcom Jeeves, Joel 
B. Greene, Ray S. Anderson, Stephen 
G. Post, and two of its three editors. 
Because it has the most to do with 
bioethics, in this discussion I will focus 
upon the essay by Post. But, perhaps I 
may first say a word or two about the 
book as a whole. 
The dualism ' against which these 
authors contend is the kind we learned 
from Rene Descartes (1596-1650) and 
others. Descartes, the universally 
acknowledge father of modern Western 
philosophy, posited a fundamental dif-
ference between thinking substance-
what we call "mind," and extended 
substance-what we call "matter." The 
question ever since has been, "If mind 
and matter differ in such a basic way, 
how can they interact?" Idealism began 
with mind and moved toward matter 
but never quite got there. Materialism 
began with matter and traveled toward 
mind but never quite reached its desti-
nation. And the various forms of paral-
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lelism began with both and depended 
upon some other factor-perhaps 
God-to keep them coordinated 
despite their contrariness. None of 
these proposals has carried the day. 
"Nonreductive physicalism," as 
articulated in this anthology, is a cre-
ative and constructive attempt to 
resolve these problems. Against dual-
ism, it holds there is only one kind of 
substance and this substance is mater-
ial. For this reason, it is appropriate to 
call this way of looking at things 
"physicalism." But this form of "phys-
icalism" is "nonreductive" in at least 
two related ways. It holds that causal 
influences between the simple and the 
complex are not unilateral in either 
direction but reciprocal. It also holds 
that mind does emerge from matter in 
ways that can have an important 
impact upon matter. The essays in this 
anthology explore this point of view 
from a variety of angles: biological, 
biblical, historical, philosophical, theo-
logical and ethical. 
In "A Moral Case for 
Nonreductive Physicalism," Stephen 
G. Post, a professor at Case Western 
University, doesn't presume that dual-
ism is dead. Neither does he spend 
much time demonstrating why we all 
would be better off if it were. The gist 
of his argument is that, although dual-
ism probably is dead, at least by cere-
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bral definitions and determinations, 
bioethicists need not go through all the 
stages of grief. There are other ways, h 
contends, to deliver whatever benefit~ 
dualism provides those engaged in 
health and healing, and those 
employed to think and write about 
such practices. 
According . to Post, one of these 
other ways is the Christian notion of 
love. We need not ground our continu-
ing care for those who are severely 
deformed or demented in the belief 
that we can revere their immortal souls 
despite the mortality of their bodies. 
Instead, we should regard them as 
among those whom Jesus of Nazareth 
and others taught us to love as we our-
selves have been loved: unconditionally. 
Post is surely right about this. 
Among other things, to be a Christian is 
to have at least a dim awareness of what 
others have also sensed, that the flow-
ering of love depends as much upon 
the one who loves as upon the one who 
is loved, probably more. So yes, even in 
a world after the death of dualism, we 
will have reasons enough not to aban 
don the wounded and ill. 
Even unconditional love must be a 
bit discriminating, however. Faced 
with the alternative of saving a human 
form sculptured either from marble, or 
one fashioned of flesh and bone, we 
know where our obligation lies. That's 
the easiest case. The others are more 
difficult, sometimes much more so. But 
even with respect to them, Post is right: 
love as expressed in the life and teach-
ings of Jesus of Nazareth urges us to 
practice much reluctance when it 
comes to assessing the comparative 
worthiness of those who need our skill 
and care. This is so whether dualism 
lives or dies. 
But what is the prognosis for dual-
ism? .My own view is that it is both wor-
thier of death and less likely to die than 
some may think. 
Post skillfully traces the negative 
ethical consequences of holding that 
mind and matter are fundamentally dif-
ferent. For all humans who have been 
considered more "material" tha 
"mental," this doctrine has been devas-
tating, whether they were slaves, 
women, children, or members of tribes 
other than our own. It has also con-
tributed to harmful attitudes and 
continued on page 7 
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A Tale of Two Physicians 
Mark Carr 
If we could imagine the perfect physician, what would 
he or she be like? 
On the one hand,William Osler exemplified our notion 
of an ideal physician. Born in the back woods of Ontario, 
Canada, in 1849, to missionary parents, he later entered 
medical school at McGill University in Montreal, Ontario. 
That is where he landed his first job as lecturer of physiol-
ogy and pathology in 1874. 
At McGill, he was influential in establishing the use of 
the microscope. His time at McGill was just the beginning 
of a truly stellar career in medicine. He moved to the 
University of Pennsylvania at Philadelphia in 1884, then on 
to Johns Hopkins Medical School in 1889 as the chair of 
medicine. Finally, in 1905 he moved to Oxford University 
where he slowed down a bit and enjoyed his later years. He 
died in 1919 having established himself as the most influ-
ential teaching doctor of his era. 
He wrote a medical school textbook, The Principles and 
Practice of Medicine, in 1892. This text continued through 16 
editions with 84 reprintings. It was published in English, 
-' erman, French, Spanish, and Chinese! He wrote a dozen 
or so other books and more than 1000 articles throughout 
his career. 
Osler was and continues to be considered a model 
physician and an excellent teacher of medicine. But what 
did he have to say about the kind of persons that physicians 
ought to be? What kind of physician did he encourage his 
students to be? 
In his most famous lecture, "Aequanimitas," Osler says 
that: "No quality takes rank with imperturbability! 
Imperturbability means coolness and presence of mind under all 
circumstances .. . immobility, impassiveness, or, to use an old and 
expressive word, phlegm. " 1 
For Osler, the ideal physician would have his/her 
"medullary centers under the highest control" such that the 
physician's face would never show the "slightest dilator or 
contractor influence" in the presence of one's patient. 
Nothing could be allowed to disturb the physician who 
was to develop certain qualities of "insensibility," "callous-
ness," and "a judicious measure of obtuseness." 
But wait! Is this the ideal physician we would want 
to see in our illness? 
In times of illness, is this the doctor we want to visit? 
When we must face the tragic news of our own mortality, 
-- would we be ministered to by the doctor who breaks this news 
to us without the slightest change in facial expression? Do we 
want doctors who are cool and detached? Will we appreciate 
"detached concern" as concern or simply detachment? Would 
we sense in this kind of care provider someone who has com-
passion and empathy for us?- someone who cares? 
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I suspect that we would rather doctors engage their 
emotions in the process of sharing in the tragedy of our ill-
nesses. I suspect that we would like our care providers to 
somehow show us that they really do care. We might even 
like a doctor who would occasionally be moved to tears 
with us as we face our own deaths, particularly when death 
comes by way of tragedy. 
The call for emotion in physician/patient relationships 
Many ethicists today are calling for a renewed appreci-
ation for the force of emotion in the moral life. 
Carol Gilligan, author of In a Different Voice, has urged 
us to consider whether or not detachment is an essential 
sign of moral maturity. In the wake of Kantian ethics and 
Cartesian notions of rationality, definitions of the moral life 
became devoid of an appreciation for the role of emotion in 
our moral deliberations. 2 
Advancing what she calls the "care perspective" 
Gilligan argues that "detachment is the moral problem."3 
For her, a moral person must be in meaningful connection 
with others, as opposed to an autonomous individual choice 
maker. 
From the care perspective, the Oslerian physician, in 
his/her judicious obtuseness, fails miserably in attaining 
any semblance of moral maturity-medical giants perhaps, 
but moral dwarfs! 
Nancy Sherman is a philosopher who, along with 
Gilligan, argues that a person simply cannot be moral if that 
person fails to engage his/her emotions in a meaningful 
way. 
The Oslerian physician may make a clinical decision 
that is medically sound and sufficiently objective without 
ever connecting emotionally with the patient, but accord-
ing to Sherman, this physician has certainly NOT made a 
moral decision or even a good one. Good decisions-moral 
decisions-must engage the emotions. 
"To act rightly," says Sherman, "is to reason and see in 
a way that brings to bear the lessons of the heart as much as 
the lessons of a calmer intellect."4 To act morally, one must 
include "the vision and sensitivity of the emotions. "4 
When we fail to engage our emotions, "we do not fully reg-
ister the facts or record them with the sort of resonance and 
importance that only emotional involvement can sustain. It 
is as if we could see, but only flatly and inertly, as if our per-
ceptions were strung together in our minds but not fully 
understood or embraced."S (continued next page) 
Mark Carr, PhD 
Assistant Professor, Faculty of Religion 
Loma Linda University 
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Justin Oakley, author of Morality and the Emotions, 
argues that those who attempt to live out a moral life, with-
out engaging the emotions, simply will not be able to 
"understand some features of the world."6 
So what kind of a doctor do we want? 
If we are somehow dissatisfied with the kind of high-
ly skilled, technically able, medical giant of a doctor like 
that described by Dr. Osler, what do we want? 
Let the following story illustrate the kind of doctor to 
whom we are drawn: 
"He visited our little Janet twice every day from the middle 
of October until her death a month later, and these visits she 
looked forward to with a pathetic eagerness and joy. There would 
be a little tap, low down on the door which would be pushed open, 
and a crouching figure playing goblin would come in, and in a 
high-pitched voice would ask if the fairy godmother was at home 
and could he have a bit of tea. Instantly the sick-room was turned 
into a fairyland, and in fairy language he would talk about the 
flowers, the birds, and the dolls who sat at the foot of the bed who 
were always greeted with, 'Well, all ye loves.' In the course of this 
he would manage to find out all he wanted to know about the lit-
tle patient .... The most exquisite moment came one cold, raw, 
November morning when the end was near, and he mysteriously 
brought out from his inside pocket a beautiful red rose carefully 
wrapped in paper, and told how he had watched this last rose of 
summer growing in his garden and how the rose had called out to 
him as he passed by, that she wished to go along with him to see 
his little lassie. That evening we all had a fairy tea party, at a 
tiny tea table by the bed, the good doctor talking to the rose, his lit-
tle lassie, and her mother in the most exquisite way; and present-
ly he slipped out of the room just as mysteriously as he had entered 
it, all crouched down on his heels; and the little girl understood 
that neither the fairies nor people could always have the color of 
a red rose in their cheeks, or stay as long as they wanted in one 
place, but that they nevertheless would be very happy in another 
home and must not let the people they left behind, particularly 
their parents, feel badly about it; and the little girl understood 
and was not unhappy. "7 
It seems a fair distance must lie between the cool 
detachment of the clinical expert described by Osler and 
the compassionate and caring friend of this dying little 
lassie. We might easily say that the fine doctor was just 
condescending to the child's level in the effort to apply his 
technical skills. But even if we look at it that way, we are 
hard pressed to see a physician who cultivates obtuseness, 
callousness, and imperturbability being at the same time 
able to condescend to the child's level with such ease. And 
we might easily resort to the tired excuse that we just don't 
have the luxury of taking such time with our patients 
anymore. 
But, I rather suspect that we still would like our physi-
cians to be a wonderful blend of technical skill and emo-
tional acumen. Such a physician would possess a body of 
objective, scientific knowledge of medicine, which he or 
she would bring to bear on our behalf, but would do it in 
such a way that would include sensitivity to our emotional 
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state, and also his or her own emotional state. We need 
doctors who will tune into their emotions. 
But herein lies the problem: namely, when peopl 
engage their emotions, they place themselves on danger-
ous ground-or so we have always thought. It is true; our 
emotions can be overwhelming. Our emotions, when fully 
considered, hold the potential of totally distracting and 
unraveling our ability to sustain our courses of action-
courses of action which in the medical clinic may at times 
involve matters of life and death. In other words, our emo-
tions can completely disable us from moving forward in 
any manageable fashion. 
Considering the emotions 
Consider for a moment typical ways we refer to emo-
tion and its expression: 
We say that we fall in love; 
We say we are "overcome with anger;" 
We sometimes just can't take any more and we "lose" it; 
In the face of fear, I might say "I couldn't help myself, 
it just swept over me like a wave;" 
I might say of my feelings toward my children, "my 
pride welled up within me and over-flowed in tears." 
Each of these common ways of experiencing emotion 
refers to it as an event in which we are merely passive-as 
if we're just stumbling along like normal and emotion 
comes upon us like a wave we are unable to avoid or mane 
age in any way. There is nothing we can do once we allow,,_ 
ourselves to be caught or overcome by it. We simply suc-
cumb to it, wait it out, and hope it passes quickly and with-
out too much damage! 
Or, on the other hand, in the case of love, we hope that 
it lingers and our sense of euphoria stays with us longer 
and longer. 
But should we understand emotions in this way? 
Modern theorists of emotion tell us, with a high degree of 
unanimity, this is not an accurate or helpful way to under-
stand the experience of emotion. Today, the so-called cog-
nitive theories of emotion are telling us that humans are 
not simply dumb or passive to the experience of emotion, 
but that emotion, by definition, involves the entirety of 
our humanness-both mind and body. 
The old theory of emotion holds that emotions are 
physiological events that we must suffer. The new theory 
holds that emotion is a combination of physiological move-
ment and psychological appraisal. This notion of psycho-
logical appraisal as an essential element of emotion recog-
nizes we are not sufferers in the face of emotion, but are 
able, in fact, to rationally perceive, engage, and manage to 
some degree the overall experience of emotion. 
So, when Gilligan, Sherman, and Oakley call for the 
inclusion of emotion for a richer understanding of the 
moral life, when medical ethicists call for physicians t<.l 
fully engage their emotions under the influence of the 
renewed cognitive theories of emotion, none of them is 
calling for an experience of emotion that would debilitate 
the physician. None of them is calling for physicians to 
occasionally fall in a lump on the clinic floor and cry like 
babies overcome with tragedy and grief. (continued . . .) 
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But still, even if such renewed theories of emotion 
.~xist, it remains a difficult task to manage our emotions in 
, ch a way that they do not disable us from the task at hand. 
~hven if we recognize we need not be passive sufferers of 
emotion, they do occasionally "get the best of us." Because 
this is true, we hold back from them and hesitate to engage 
them. 
And herein lies the difference temperance makes: 
Temperance to the rescue! 
Temperance is the virtue-the character trait-that 
allows us to respond to the movements of emotion in such 
as way as to help provide for their positive engagement in 
our moral lives. 
At the base or beginning point of any emotion lies some 
sort of physiological or psychological desire. Temperance is 
the virtue whose task it is to respond to our desires. 
Historically, it has most often been referred to as the 
virtue that responds to our desires for food, drink, and sex. 
If we can just bring some sort of control or restraint over our 
desires for excessive amounts of these basic human goods, 
then we can experience the good life without physically 
destroying ourselves. 
Socially we see this understanding of temperance in 
the history of America through the temperance movement 
of the late 1800s. The Seventh-day Adventist Church was 
~eply involved in this social movement and still tends to 
~quate temperance with abstinence. 
There are, however, a number of other ways that tem-
perance has been understood over the years of Western civ-
ilization. 
The broad conceptions of temperance: 
1. Sophrosyne: the Greek notion of soundness of mind. A 
type of personal harmony that responds and manages all 
aspects of our humanness with finesse that only people of 
sound minds could muster. (l\1ark 5:1-20, especially 15; Acts 
26:24-32; Romans 12:3) 
2. Moderation: This term is fairly straightforward. But 
the difficulty of using it as synonymous with temperance is 
that temperance gets lost to the notion of "moderation in all 
things" which temperance is not! Temperance, in its 
essence, is the virtuous response to the physiological and 
psychological movements of emotion. It can be helpful to 
understand temperance as "moderation in all things" but it 
also misses much of what is important about it. This con-
fuses things with Aristotle's notion of the "golden mean." 
3. Temperantia as "proper mixture:" The transition to 
Latin from Greek brought our current word to bear. At its 
root is the notion of a proper mixture; not abstinence, not 
qpathy, but an inclusion and a mixing-in of those things we 
esire will catch the essence of temperantia. 
4. Decorum (propriety), or what I like to call "social man-
ner:" It was the Roman political philosopher Cicero who 
described temperance as decorum or propriety. The deco-
rum with which the temperate person carries himself/her-
self illustrates the very essence of the virtue of temperance. 
The early church pastor, Ambrose, describes being dis-
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gusted by the lack of temperance or decorum displayed by 
one particular associate in ministry. Ambrose forbade the 
man to ever walk in front of him because his gait was so 
unseemly! 
The narrow conceptions of temperance 
While broad conceptions of temperance tend to con-
flate temperance with virtue in general, narrow conceptions 
tend to limit its relevance to controlling or restraining spe-
cific forms of human physical desire. 
Self-control: If one is temperate in the sense of being 
able to assert some self-control, it means that, despite the 
desire to enjoy or express some human passion, one will 
suppress one's desire to do so. 
Self-restraint: If one is temperate in this way, it means 
one is able to hold one's self back from enjoying or express-
ing some human passion, such as sexual contact, dietary 
excess, or alcohol consumption. One must suppress one's 
true desires in this view. 
Both self-control and self-restraint fall short of the true 
virtue of temperance. They are closer to the notion of con-
tinence as a pseudo-virtue. The difference is crucial: tem-
perance is the perfected character trait that not only no 
longer desires a second piece of chocolate cake, but finds 
pleasure in no longer desiring it. Continence, on the other 
hand, may be able to control or suppress the desire to have 
the second piece of chocolate cake, but the desire is still 
there and may in fact be very strong. 
The external behavior of both temperate and continent 
persons is exactly the same, but the temperate person is 
settled and in harmony with his/her desires. The continent 
person however, experiences an internal struggle with 
his/her desires and the expression of them. 
The normative conception of temperance: 
Self-management attempts to recapture notions of tem-
perance as being a soundness of mind emerging from both 
Greek and Christian conceptions. As opposed to the efforts 
to control or restrain our desires, and the resultant emotion-
al experiences, self-management seeks a kind of guidance 
of human passion that encourages a positive inclusion of 
them. 
Temperance, then, is not a means to hold down and 
restrain human passions as much as a perfected habitual 
response to the passions that seeks to carefully direct and 
guide them in the overall experience of emotion in our 
moral life. 
The full experience of emotion includes what we 
call passion and emotion, but there is a difference between 
the two. Passion is the essential physiological element of 
emotion, but not the entirety of the experience of emotion. 
After temperance does its work of management with the 
desires of human passion, then we might say we have expe-
rienced emotion. Temperance is akin, in this formulation, 
to the "appraisal systems" of the cognitive theories of emo-
tion. 
The point of all this temperance talk is to argue that, if 
we want to include emotion in the moral life, we would do 
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well to foster the development of the virtue of temperance. 
Temperance is the first and most important virtue in the 
response to the movements (passions) of emotion in the 
human person. 
If we want to go to physicians who will be persons who 
fully engage their emotions in clinical medicine we will also 
want them to be temperate persons. And by that I hope you 
have gathered by now I don't simply mean that they should 
be the kind of temperate persons who are in strict control of 
their desires for drink, food, and sex. 
The "caring" physician 
What kind of physician do we want? 
On the one hand, we want a physician who is the con-
summate technician who knows his/her science like none 
other. If he or she is aloof, cold, detached, and obtuse, so be 
it! At least we . can have confidence in his/her ability. 
However, we still have some sense of dissatisfaction with 
this kind of physician. 
On the other hand, as expressed through the story of 
the physician who cared enough for his "little lassie" to 
visit every day for a "spot of tea" and a heightened spirit, 
we want a physician who really cares about us. I want a 
physician who will cry with me in the face of tragedy and 
triumph. I want a physician who will be at my beside and 
share more than his/her technical skills. 
I conclude with a story and then a revelation about the 
physicians about which I have been telling these stories. 
"The story is told of a young brother with very severe whoop-
ing cough and bronchitis, unable to eat and wholly unresponsive 
to the blandishments of parents and devoted nurses alike. 
Clinically it was not an abstruse case, but weapons were few and 
recovery seemed unlikely. 
The good doctor, hard pressed for time, arrived already wear-
ing his doctor's robes. To a small child this was the advent of a 
doctor! After a very brief examination, this unusual visitor sat 
down, peeled a peach, sugared it, and cut it in pieces. He then pre-
sented it bit by bit with a fork to the entranced patient, telling him 
to eat it up, and that he would not be sick but would find it did 
him good as it was a most special fruit. Such proved to be the case. 
As he hurried off, the good doctor, most uncharacteristically, pat-
ted my father kindly on the back and said with deep concern, "I'm 
sorry, Ernest, but I don't think I shall see the boy again; there's 
very little chance when they're as bad as that." Happily, events 
turned out otherwise, and for the next forty days, this constantly 
busy man came to see the child, and for each of these forty days, he 
put on his doctor's robes in the hall before going to the sick room. 
After some two or three days, recovery began to be obvious 
and the small boy always ate or drank and retained some nour-
ishment which the good doctor gave him with his own two hands. 
If the value of personal approach, ... if the consideration and extra 
trouble required to meet the needs of an individual patient, were 
ever well illustrated, here it was in fullest flower. It would, I sub-
mit, be impossible to find a fairer example of healing as an art. 
This kind of inspired magic, independent of higher degrees and 
laboratory gimmicks, is given only to a doctor with a real voca-
tion, and the will to employ it. " 8 
So the story goes .... 
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And now the revelation 
The "good doctor" in each of the stories above is t 
same doctor who prescribed imperturbability for his audience. 
William Osler was the consummate technician, as well as the 
consummate person. His notion of the virtue "equanimity" is 
very close to the normative notion of temperance I under-
stand to be essential for a physician who wants to helpfully 
include emotion in clinical and moral deliberation. @ 
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continued from page 2 
actions toward the needs and satisfac-
' ~ons of our own bodies, particularly 
40se pertaining to sexuality. And it con-
tinues to foster more subtle forms of 
alienation between our identities as 
"bodies" and our identities as "persons" 
or "selves." 
I agree with Post. I would add that 
dualism has also contributed to misfor-
tunes in the ecological arena, in educa-
tional theory and practice, and in our 
ranking of the various ways people earn 
their living. It has tempted us to gIve 
more prestige to theoretical disciplines 
than practical ones-even in theology. 
Dualism has often made it more diffi-
cult to delineate ~he proper roles of 
church and state, and to define 
As Post indicates so well, however, 
dualism has much gOing for it-so 
much so that I think it too early to cel-
ebrate its demise. For one thing, partly 
because it has been taught so long, to 
many it represents the deliverance of 
"common sense." For another, it gives 
us some way to understand how we 
might be the same persons today we 
were yesterday and will be tomorrow. 
Yet agaIn, dualism gives us some-
thing-the mind-to which we can 
attribute the measure of freedom we 
enjoy and expect others to respect. Still 
further, particularly when the alleged 
fundamental difference between mind 
and matter becomes a disjunction 
between the mortal body and the 
eaSIer said than done. To undo what 
Descartes did is to begin thinking of 
mind and matter, not as two fundamen-
tally different things, but as two aspects 
of every occurrence. It is to begin think-
Ing of mind and matter as present at 
every level of being from the most com-
plex to the least. 
This is not to say that conscious-
ness, awareness, or thought are present 
all the way down the scale of life, but 
that their premonitions- their precur-
sors-most certainly are. It is to say that 
mind and matter are distinguishable but 
not separable. As the history of Western 
thought since the 17th century demon-
strates, if mind and matter are not inte-
grated in some way at the bottom of the 
the purposes of the Christian 
community's own life. Worst of 
all, I think dualism's conse-
quences for the human under-
standing of God have often 
been most unfortunate. 
\Varren S. Brown, .Murphy Nancey and H . . Malony 
Newton, eds. Whatever Happened to the Soul? 
Scientific and Theological Portrait, of Human .. !Vatun;. 
M inneapolis: Augsburg Fortress, 1998. 272 pages. 
ISBN 08-00631412. U.S. $20.00 
scale of being, it is difficult to 
see how they can be integrated 
at the top. 
To be sure, even if one stip-
ulates that they are not con-
scious, it is difficult to imagine 
that subatomic occurrences are 
It is not necessary, of 
course, to equate the distinc-
'"ion between mind and matter with the 
ifference between body and soul. 
Even if we make this move, however, 
nothing compels us to hold that the 
human soul is innately immortal. But 
even if we come to that questionable 
conclusion, nothing requires us to 
believe that God will torment the 
immortal souls of some sinners forever. 
And even if we can muster the will to 
believe that, nothing forces us to 
believe that, from all eternity, God has 
predestined that these poor sinners, 
who are no more evil than others, shall 
glorify His sovereign name by endless-
ly suffering His severest punishments. 
My point is not that people cannot 
provide evidence they find convincing 
regarding these matters from Scripture, 
reason, tradition, experience, or some 
combination of them. To the contrary, 
my suggestion is that in fact, if not nec-
essarily in principle, dualism has often 
been the first link in a long chain of 
convictions the entire length of which, if 
true, would make it difficult for me to 
Torship and emulate the One in whom 
we live and move and have our being. 
F or me, the moral case against 
dualism includes a revulsion toward 
what it, when combined with other 
doctrines, has often implied about the 
ethical nature of God. 
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immortal soul, dualism gIves us all 
some hope that, In the hereafter, 
wrongs will be made right and justice 
will finally be served. As Post docu-
ments so well, dualism has nurtured 
the conviction that, because he or she 
possesses an immortal soul, every 
human being is of great intrinsic worth. 
With all this on its side, we might to do 
well to brace ourselves against its contin-
uing life and influence. 
There is another and more trou-
bling reason why dualism is not likely 
to die any time soon: its primary rivals 
often have no more philosophical merit 
than it does. The history of Western 
philosophy SInce the day Rene 
Descartes defined a fundamental dif-
ference between thinking substance 
on the one hand, and extended sub-
stance on the other, IS In part the 
account of alternative schools of 
thought unsuccessfully trying to inte-
grate what he disintegrated. Less than 
satisfactory conclusions were reached 
all around the circle. 
As people like William James and 
Alfred North Whitehead suggested 
earlier in our century, the only way for-
ward is to go back to Descartes and 
reunite what he separated. But because 
it requires us to reconsider in a basic 
way how we think about things, this is 
"mentaL" But isn 't it just as dif-
ficult to think of them as "mate-
rial?" Doesn't our greater comfort with 
the first set of difficulties tell us some-
thing about ourselves? Doesn't it sug-
gest that Descartes' dualism penetrates 
our thinking and feeling more than we 
perhaps realize? 
What Stephen G. Post and his col-
leagues say about "nonreductive physi-
calism" in Whatever Happened to the Soul? 
deserves careful examination and evalu-
ation. Depending upon how one con-
strues what they write, their alternative 
is either a more nuanced account of how 
mind allegedly emerges from nothing 
but mindless matter and then loops 
back with an impact upon mind, or it is 
an acknowledgment that mind and mat-
ter are integrated in some appropriate 
way at every level of being. Insofar as 
their doctrine is a form of "physical-
ism," the first interpretation seems 
more accurate. Insofar as it is "nonre-
ductive," the second seems more judi-
CIOUS. Even if the first claim is closer to 
their view, it is a significant improve-
ment over the conviction that causal 
influences always flow from matter to 
mind, never the other way around. 
I hope the second reading is more 
accurate, because if it is, and if what 
Stephen Post and his colleagues 
expound catches on, this time dualism 
may be truly dead. Maybe! @ 
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